Systemic functional research community
on interpersonal and ideational grammar

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Abstracts

James BENSON
Glendon College

Confrontation and support in bonobo-human discourse

The exchange of  interpersonal meanings is the engine that drives discourse. The negotiation of such interpersonal meanings can be coded in terms of systematic choices in speech functions. The system network for casual conversation developed by Eggins and Slade (1997) provides an opportunity to investigate the extent to which Kanzi, a bonobo at the Language Research Center at Georgia State University, is able to negotiate the interpersonal meanings of confrontation and support in terms of human discourse practices.

Marta CARETTERO
Universidad Complutense de Madrid

Epistemic modality and evidentiality: on their interrelationship and their role within appraisal theory

According to the definitions of epistemic modality and evidentiality most commonly found in the literature, they can easily be viewed as two different categories: epistemic modality is defined as the expression of the addresser’s (i.e. speaker or writer’s) estimation of the chances that an utterance has of being or becoming true, and evidentiality as the expression of the source of the evidence which the addresser has at his/her disposal as regards the truth of an utterance. In spite of this conceptual difference, it can be argued that there is a(n almost) complete overlap between both categories, in that the overt expression of one inevitably conveys hints about the other.

Firstly, I will suggest that there is a continuum between epistemic modality and evidentiality. The ‘purest’ epistemic expressions are those which give a precise estimation of the probability but only very vague hints about the evidence, such as the modals MAY and MIGHT, whereas the ‘purest’ evidentials are those which clearly specify the source of evidence but give vague hints about the probability, such as the quotation of an external source of information. In between lie a great number of realisations, such as verbs of mental processes (SEE, HEAR), and adverbs (CLEARLY, OBVIOUSLY). Each part of the continuum will be treated from the conceptual and realisational viewpoints.

Secondly, I will present a proposal for specifying the role of modality and evidentiality in Appraisal Theory. As White (1999) indicates, both devices belong to the ‘heterogloss’ type of ‘engagement’, in that they acknowledge the diversity of heteroglossic positions. Departing from the ‘intravocalise’ and ‘extravocalise’ options, I will propose a classification of the different realisations according to their degree of subjectivity.

White, P.R.R. (1999) An introductory tour through Appraisal Theory. Paper presented at the 11th Euro-International Systemic Workshop, University of Gent, July 1999.

Kristin DAVIDSE
University of Leuven

On the function of Subject

The specific functional contribution made by the Subject remains one of the least understood areas of clause grammar, with few attempts getting beyond the ‘unmarked’ mapping of Subject with Theme and Agent. This paper will attempt to further substantiate and develop Halliday’s (1985/1994) radically interpersonal interpretation of the Subject as the element in which the speaker vests the success of his speech act.

Dialogue with analytical philosophy naturally imposes itself here, keeping in mind that against the more ‘extrinsic’ forms of functionalism generally found there, an ‘intrinsic’ form of functionalism is advocated, according to which the functions served by utterances are reflected in the form of these utterances.

Thus, clauses can serve their functions of exchanging ‘knowables’ and ‘desirables’ because of their internal organisation into the Subject-Finite – Predicator-Complement-Adjunct pattern. This general proposition will be subdivided into two main points:

1. The formally-based distinction of the English clause proposed by Halliday (1985/1994) into Mood and Residue can, following the leads of authors such as Langacker (1991) and Strawson (1974), be functionally interpreted as one of ‘instantiating complex’ and ‘type specification of a process’.  The  ‘instantiating’ function of the Subject – as distinct from the grounding function of the finite element – can be studied advantageously in constructions without finite element such as act-clauses and gerundive nominalizations. The challenge for an intrinsic (‘linguistic’) functional approach remains to capture the precise nature of the structural relation between Mood element and Residue.

2. It is this internal clause pattern (of instantiating complex and processual type specification) that enables and determines the exchange functions of the clause. Indicatives assert information of the Subject, interrogatives ‘unassert’ information with regard to the Subject, imperatives demand action of the (implied) Subject, etc. It is because of its ‘instantiating’ function that the Subject plays the ‘modally (mood-related) responsible’ function assigned to it by Halliday.

Halliday, M.A.K. (1985/1991) An Introduction to Functional Grammar. London: Arnold.

Langacker, R. W. (1991) Foundations of Cognitive Grammar. Volume II. Descriptive Application. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Strawson, P. F. (1974) Subject and Predicate in Logic and Grammar. London: Methuen.

Eirian DAVIES
University of London

On the Semantics of Syntax. Mood and Condition in English
London: Croom Helm, 1979

Reading seminar, devoted to the following chapters:

Chapter 1, “Introduction”, pp. 15-18

Chapter 3, “A Framework of Semantic Analysis”, pp. 43-80

Chapter 8, “Condition and Reason”, pp. 146-176

Alexanne DON
University of Birmingham  

Some implications of Harré’s Positioning Theory for construing Tenor

The Positioning Theory of Rom Harré and his colleagues offers some interesting suggestions as to how we might explore the discursive construction of identity. This paper will suggest that textually determined identities emerge from the interplay between notions of roles, relationships and positions. I will examine how the realisation of these notions can be explored linguistically and the implications of such an analysis for the construal of Tenor.

Angela DOWNING
Universidad Complutense de Madrid

A versatile evidential in British English: the case of  surely

Evidentiality is usually taken to refer basically to the grammaticalisation of ways  in which speakers qualify a statement by signalling their awareness of their sources of information. The relative authority of the different sources then leads to assessment  by the speaker of the reliability of the message itself. While not denying the validity of these claims, I would take a broader and more ethnographic view of evidentiality, which would  contemplate evidentials as  interactive devices or resources for  redefining common ground between interlocutors. According to such a view, which is also reflected in the literature (Haviland 1987), evidentials go beyond referential content to signal such meanings as illocutionary force, contentiousness and contradictory assumptions. They encode not only what a speaker knows but also what can be taken to be an addressee’s state of knowledge. They are necessarily situated in social contexts and have an indexical function. They may also overlap to some extent with epistemic stances and with affect. In my present study I will examine one evidential marker in British English – surely – which is strongly interpersonal. Using data from the British National Corpus, I analyse a sample  of occurrences, each within its available context, and attempt  to provide a preliminary characterisation of the range of meanings which  this evidential marker conveys.

Patrick GOETHALS
VLEKHO/University of Leuven

Indexicality

My basic claim is that the Peircian concept of indexicality offers a semiotic tool to define and delimit the interpersonal component of grammar. Indexical signs are opposed to symbolic signs, in that the former identify a semiotic object that is actually present in the (interpersonal) here and now, whereas the latter present this same semiotic object as a third-order entity, i.e. as a mental representation that does not necessarily correspond with something in the here and now. As such, the interpersonal component could possibly be defined as the whole of indexical signs that identify the different characteristics of the actual occurring speech event.

In a previous study, I concentrated upon the distinction between the ideational and the interpersonal component and criticized the idea of including tense and deixis in the interpersonal component.

In this paper I will focus on the boundary between the interpersonal and the textual component and more specifically on the question in which component we should describe conjunctions and adverbial connectives. As sample cases I will discuss the Spanish explicative conjunctions “como”, “ya que” and “pues” (resp. “as”, “since” and “for” in English), and the Spanish consecutive adverbial connectives “pues” and “por tanto” (resp. “so” and “therefore” in English).

I will claim that all these elements can be treated within the interpersonal component (defined as the whole of indexical, speech-event-identifying signs) and that their meaning can be described as a way of identifying a particular speech event. This way of analyzing connectives recalls the (implicit) suggestion of MAK Halliday 1985 when he described these connective elements within the chapter dedicated to the mood component.

Liesbet HEYVAERT
University of Leuven

The role of grounding in nominalization: the case of the Subject

The prevailing systemic-functional approach to nominalizations fits in with, on the one hand, Halliday’s ideational focus in the description of nominal groups in general (Halliday 1994) and, on the other hand, with his theoretical assumption that ‘classes’ can be defined only on the basis of how a unit functions in the structure of the unit next above (Halliday 1961): the classification of nominalizations as ‘nominal’ is, in other words, based on how they behave in clauses rather than on internal properties. If internal features are described, only ideational ones are considered (think of the term ‘ideational metaphor’, Halliday 1994:352): clause-like structures that are nominalized by being embedded in nominal groups are, for instance, described as logical Heads of the NG (e.g. That Caesar was dead was obvious to all, 1994:266); in the analysis of the relationship between nominalizations and their clausal agnates, the emphasis is on how clausal experiential categories are mapped onto nominal ones (think, for instance, of the alternative realization of a Process as Thing, of a Participant as Qualifier or Classifier).

My analysis of fact-nominalizations and of deverbal -er nominalizations wants to show how undervalued interpersonal categories are in the discussion of nominal groups in general and of nominalizations in particular: I claim that an insight into the structural encodings of an utterance’s link with the speech event is fundamental not only to understand the relationship between nominalizations and their clausal agnates, but also to elucidate the enate dimension or the coherence that exists within each nominalization system. I will, in particular, highlight the role of the Subject: the type of link which the Subject establishes with the speech event will, for instance, be shown to motivate the system of -er nominalization, agentive and non-agentive; the Subject’s role in gerundive facts (i.e. facts of the type his opening the door) will be used to illustrate how the clausal and nominal means of establishing person deixis meet in nominalizations, i.e. in the form of a possessive premodifier. And, finally, Halliday’s claim that finite clauses can be downranked in a nominal group will be shown to be supported by the interpersonal analysis of the embedded that-units: the internal interpersonal features of a finite clause turn out to be compatible with those of the nominal group.

The study of nominalizations thus reveals the need for the use of interpersonal categories in the description of nominal group structure in general: it shows that, if interpersonal functions are considered, the classification of structures as ‘nominal’ can be supported by internal properties as well (against Halliday’s claim that a class “is not a grouping of members of a given unit which are all alike in their own structure”, Halliday 1961:261). Because of the way in which they map clausal onto nominal interpersonal functions, nominalizations are, moreover, priviliged structures to investigate the exact nature of the clausal and nominal ways of establishing links with the speech event. Finally, nominalizations also provide evidence in favour of the central role of the Subject in a language that is designed for exchange.      

Halliday, M.A.K. (1961) Categories of the Theory of Grammar. Word 17.3: 241-292.   

Halliday, M.A.K. (1994) An Introduction to Functional Grammar. 2nd ed.. London: Edward Arnold.

Henrike KÖRNER
University of Sydney

Moving between two worlds: the construction of inter-discursivity in legal judgements

In a dispute before a court of law, what people did to each other or said to each other that caused the conflict, needs to be translated into a legal problem. In terms of discourse, this means the social discourse(s) of the “real” world need to be translated into the abstract discourse of the law. However, in legal discourse there is no equivalence such as “behaviour X equals legal category Y”. Drawing on Bakhtin’s notion of the dialogic nature of utterances , Fairclough’s notions of intertextuality and inter-discursivity and APPRAISAL in SFL, my argument is that re-construction of social discourse(s) as legal discourse is highly negotiatory, and the primary semantic resource to move from the social discourse of the “real” world to legal discourse is ENGAGEMENT. In this talk I will (1) present a topological model of ENGAGEMENT and (2) show how through ENGAGEMENT values, problems in the “real” world can be recast as legal problems. This involves intertextual links with a variety of other texts.

William B. McGREGOR
Århus Universitet

Complementation as interpersonal grammar

This paper is concerned with a range of complex sentence constructions, most of which are usually grouped together under the rubric “complementation”, dealing in particular, with what are sometimes called “object complements”, as in:

Such constructions have attracted considerable amount of attention in the linguistic literature during the last half century, and linguists of all theoretical persuasions have focussed attention on them. Speaking generally, formal grammars have taken the view that complement clauses are in an object relation to the main verb, and constituents of the VP (thus the label complementation). A radically different approach is proposed by Halliday 1985, who suggests that complement clauses are actually in a dependency relation to the main clause.

It seems to me that neither of these analyses adequately accounts for the facts, and I will argue that there is not a single grammatical domain carved out by constructions such as above. Rather, it is necessary to distinguish interclausal grammatical relations of at least two fundamentally different types, dependency (part-to-part), and conjugation (whole-to-whole); possibly constituency (part-to-whole) is also involved in some cases. Thus, I will present some evidence that the make‑complement above involves an inter-clausal dependency relation, in contrast with a conjugational relation in the case of the force-complement.

My main focus will be on complement constructions involving conjugational relations, which, as argued in McGregor 1997, represent the interpersonal semiotic. I attempt to adduce evidence for analysing a subset of the above in this way, and more particularly to develop the notion that they fall into two primary subtypes, neither of which is derivable from the other: framing and scope. I attempt to tease the two relations out, and demonstrate that they relate to fundamentally different modes of signifying from the interpersonal perspective, demonstration and description.

Halliday, M.A.K. (1985) An Introduction to Functional Grammar. London: Edward Arnold.

McGregor, W. B. (1997) Semiotic Grammar. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Robert SPENCE
Universitaet des Saarlandes

Modelling the role of the interpersonal dimension in political rhetoric: some recycled metaphors from acoustics, electronics, geology, knitting, mathematics, music, optics, and pastry-making

The predominantly persuasive function of political rhetoric produces a strong foregrounding of typically interpersonal articulations of semantic space in the paradigmatics of such discourse. With the benefit of hindsight, the syntagmatic consequences of this are predictable: the specific realizational profile of the interpersonal metafunction (“language as field”, in Pike’s terms) is so heavily overlaid upon that of the experiential metafunction that it awakens the latter’s dormant non-particulate potential, allowing experience to be represented trans-sententially in ways that would otherwise be impossible.

Such a co-opting (subversion, expansion, ...) of the resources of the experiential metafunction is of course only possible if the right selections are simultaneously taken up in the textual and logical metafunctions; and the entire attempt at a falsified experiential representation of political processes can unexpectedly come a cropper, due to higher-level properties of the symbiosis of semioses that both enable and constrain the discourse.

The present paper is an ecological experiment in recycling: as a meta-discourse, it attempts to polish up and revive a loose coalition of approximately twenty-year-old metaphors, applying them to the analysis of the rhetorical strategies exemplified by two (superficially) mutually opposed twenty-five-year-old object discourses: (i.) a speech read aloud by a conservative politician, and (ii.) a news conference in which a labourite politician attempts to pursue his own discourse goals at the expense of those of the journalists.  Although both politicians construct their discourse with great skill, there are points at which the entire semiotic construct threatens to break; at these points the interpersonal metafunction is particularly strongly foregrounded and its interactions with the other metafunctions can be perceived with an unusual degree of clarity.

The key cabinet posts in the metadiscourse’s coalition of metaphors, together with their respective political affiliations, are as follows:

• the Minister for Resonance (Acoustics Party);

• the Minister for Accumulation, Discharge and Hysteresis (Electronics Party);

• the Minister for Plate Tectonics (Geology Party);

• the Minister for Fractality (Mathematics Party);

• the Minister for Two-Part Fugues for Solo Violin (Musicians’ Union);

• the Minister for Refraction (Optics Party); and

• the Minister for Emplexis (Knitters’ and Pastrymakers’ Union).

It would be presumptuous to claim that this quaintly antiquated coalition of metaphors from pre- Appraisal Theory days is capable of maintaining itself in the face of the theoretical rigour of more modern approaches to the discursive role of the interpersonal metafunction; but where fundamental positions are no longer successfully contestable, an orderly withdrawal will be made, accompanied by a sustained series of earnest skirmishes.

Miriam TAVERNIERS
University of Gent

Modelling the interpersonal: ‘instantiation’ and types of ‘grounding’

Davidse adapts Langacker’s notion of ‘grounding’ to explain the semantic aspect of interpersonal semiotics at the level of the clause. She links ‘grounding’ to the more general concept of ‘instantiation’, interpreting the Mood as “instantiating complex” and defining the Subject as “Instantiator”.

In this paper, I will explore how this explanatory framework using the notions of ‘instantiation’ and ‘grounding’ can be extended beyond the default, congruent interpersonal grammar of the clause (temporal, modal and person deixis). This exploration will be theoretical, focussing on ‘instantiation’ as a general, semiotic concept. The main question will be: can the concept of ‘instantiation’ define and explain the basic semiotic nature of the interpersonal metafunction?

The specific nature of grounding will be defined in relation to instantiation: grounding will be characterized as a particular case of instantiation. Various types of grounding will be distinguished, taking into account interpersonal grammatical metaphors of modality, and more broadly the interpersonal area of evidentiality.

If time permits, the notion of instantiation will be linked to the related concepts of indexicality, deicticity and valeur/(e)valuation.

Paul J. THIBAULT
University of Venice / University of Bologna

Some propositions and proposals concerning mood

Mood is a core grammatical system which is used in the interpersonal enactment of speech act moves or functions in discourse (cf. illocutionary force in speech act theory). However, mood is not the same as the illocutionary force – the interpersonal meaning – of an utterance in context (see Martin 1981, 1992; Halliday 1984; Thibault 1995; Thibault and Van Leeuwen 1996, McGregor 1997). In Halliday’s account, the English mood categories declarative, interrogative, and imperative congruently realise the speech functions of statement, question, and command, respectively. Typically, the speech function categories are glossed in terms of the exchange of information and/or goods-&-services. Systemic-functional linguists are in general agreement about the need to keep the grammatical category of mood and the interpersonal semantic-pragmatic category of speech function clearly distinct, though the choice of mood clearly contributes to the way a given speech act is construed in the discourse semantics. In this paper, I shall re-explore the interpersonal definition of mood in terms of a different, hopefully complementary, view with respect to the notion of information and/or goods-&-services exchange. I shall argue that mood has to do centrally with the ways in which the addresser seeks to conjoin (or disjoin), or otherwise align, the addressee with respect to the former’s modal investment in and orientation to the Subject of the Proposition or Proposal. Thus, Mood choice plays its role in positioning the addressee as having a (potentially) different modal position – c.f. Bakhtin’s “alien word” – which can be negotiated, as seen from the orientational framework of the addresser. The negotiation of this modalised “friction” or difference between the two positions depends on the addressee’s willingness to take up and accept, or not, the addresser’s modal orientation, as realised in the mood choice, and to engage with this, to be conjoined with it, and so on. Mood is not the only resource which is involved in these dynamics, though it will be the specific focus of this paper. The discussion will therefore propose a new look at the system of Mood, as well as relate this to some specific texts so as to illustrate the arguments to be developed.

Geoff THOMPSON
University of Liverpool

Appraising glances: evaluating Martin’s model of APPRAISAL

The development of Appraisal theory (Martin, 2000) has opened up areas of interpersonal meanings that had been relatively neglected within SFL. The model has the advantage of being comprehensive, being discourse-based and including points of contact with more obviously ‘grammatical’ systems; and in many respects it works well in practice. However, text analysis using the model has thrown up a number of problematic aspects; and in this paper I explore some of these. In particular, I question whether all representations of feeling (through mental processes or agnate attributes) should be categorised as Affect; and I propose a more restricted definition of Affect. I also examine critically the criteria for distinguishing between Judgement and Appreciation. On a related issue, the identification of the entity that is appraised – on which the distinction between Judgement and Appreciation depends – is not always straightforward; and I explore the danger of relying too heavily on intuition rather than linguistic evidence in the analysis of Appraisal. Although certain of the problems remain unresolved, I suggest that the model can be usefully refined by more careful attention to the question of what entity is appraised, and by the incorporation of a broader version of the concepts of TOE (Topic-Oriented Evaluation) and ROE (Research-Oriented Evaluation) introduced by Thetela (1997).

Martin, J. R. (2000) Beyond exchange: APPRAISAL systems in English. In S. Hunston & G. Thompson (eds.) Evaluation in Text: Authorial stance and the construction of discourse. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 142-75.

Thetela, P. (1997) Entities and parameters in academic research articles. English for Specific Purposes 16/2: 101-118.

Gordon TUCKER
University of Cardiff

You may claim what you wish about alternative modality; I couldn’t possibly comment!
A corpus-based investigation of the use and function of the modal adjunct possibly

This study explores the function of the modal adjunct possibly, as elicited from the COBUILD 0.4 billion word corpus of English. The aim of the study was to throw light on the contribution of this adjunct to the overall resource for modality in the lexicogrammar of English.

The corpus reveals three – and almost exclusively three – principal lexicogrammatical locations for this adjunct:

1. As a secondary modal element in finite clauses which are already modalized through the selection of may, might, can, could and to a lesser extent will and would; e.g. “the switchover to your own reserves. You may possibly feel some hunger pangs. Half a glass of”

2. As a modal element in otherwise non-modalized clauses; e.g. “worker and shoe salesman Bill Bayeh was possibly the biggest supplier of heroin and cocaine”

3. As a modal element in non-finite clauses and other ranks of lexicogrammatical unit (e.g. nominal group, adjectival group etc.); e.g. “Abu Nidal, have died; others, like Arafat and possibly Aideed, have been forgiven.”

These three contexts initially suggest a number of functions for this modal adjunct. Firstly, as a reinforcing or clarifying element, alongside modal operators in main clauses, Secondly, as a modal resource in those cases where the selection of a modal operator is impossible or inappropriate. And thirdly, as a systemic modal option in opposition to that provided through the selection of a modal operator.

The paper explores these findings in further detail, attempts to characterise the semantic nature of this modal adjunct and proposes tentative systemic solutions.

Lieven VANDELANOTTE
University of Leuven

Free versus disclaiming indirect speech or thought

After an introductory part presenting the concepts of framing in general, and speech and thought representation specifically, in their connection to interpersonal grammar, this paper looks at the distinction between what has traditionally been called ‘free indirect speech or thought’, and a second type of speech and thought representation intermediate between direct and indirect speech, for which the label ‘disclaiming indirect speech or thought’ is put forward. It is argued that this category of speech and thought representation is a truly semiotic one in that the differing semantics is closely tied up with grammatical distinctions: disclaiming indirect speech or thought is characterized by a projected clause which is the logically dominant one, and to which the hypotactically related projecting clause adds a sort of disclaiming afterthought. The relevance of this new category is further adumbrated with reference to misinterpretations of specific examples in the literature, its characterization ex negativo of its ‘twin brother’, free indirect speech or thought, and its use in ironic and academic writing. In a final part, this paper harks back to the more general theoretical issues at stake in speech and thought representation, offering some thoughts on the interplay between ‘framing’ or ‘projection’ and ‘taxis’.

Jean-Christophe VERSTRAETE
University of Leuven

The function of the finite element in the interpersonal structure of the English clause, reconsidered from the perspective of the modal auxiliaries

In this paper, I will examine the role of the morphosyntactic category of modal verbs in the functional organization of the English clause.

I will first argue that there is a basic distinction between modals that have a specifically interpersonal function, like the epistemic modals and some types of deontic modals, and modals that do not, like the modals of ability and volition and some types of deontic modals. The divergent functional status of the modals can be demonstrated by means of their behaviour in reaction to interrogation, tense (Halliday 1970, Palmer 1990, Hengeveld 1988, Lyons 1977) and conditionality (Hengeveld 1988, Lyons 1977). I will show how each of these criteria can be explained in terms of their sensitivity to the presence or absence of interpersonal features in the modals.

On the basis of this analysis of the modal auxiliary system, I will then examine Halliday’s (1994) interpersonal description of the English clause: I will argue that Halliday’s analysis of the mood element (subject & finite verb) as the interpersonal core of the clause requires more differentiation in its treatment of modality. Because of their morphosyntactic status, modal verbs in English are by definition the finite element for any clause in which they occur (absence of non-finite forms is a defining characteristic of the English modals), which in Halliday’s terms would imply that the modal auxiliaries as a morphosyntactic category invariably have an interpersonal function. On the basis of my functional distinction in the system of modal auxiliaries, I will argue that it is necessary to differentiate between two ways in which a modal can have an interpersonal function: (1) instances where the modals as such have a specific interpersonal function, as evinced in their reaction to criteria like conditionality and interrogation, and (2) instances where the modals have an interpersonal function only by virtue of the fact that as an inherently finite verb they partake in a number of more abstract interpersonal configurations. In the first case, the interpersonal function is specific to the modal auxiliary, whereas in the second case the interpersonal function is not different from the interpersonal function of any other finite non-modal verb.

Halliday, M.A.K. (1970) Functional diversity in language as seen from a consideration of modality and mood in English. Foundations of Language 6: 322-61.

Halliday, M.A.K. (1994) An Introduction to Functional Grammar. 2^nd ed. London: Arnold.

Hengeveld, K. (1988) Illocution, mood and modality in a functional grammar of Spanish. Journal of Semantics 6: 227-69.

Lyons, J. (1977) Semantics. Volume 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Palmer, F. (1990) Modality and the English modals. 2^nd ed. London: Longman.

Peter WHITE
University of Birmingham

The Sixth Modal – Bakhtin and the grammar of intersubjective positioning

In this paper I will raise issues related to how SFL models the semantics of intersubjective positioning through its grammatical accounts of such systems as modality, negation, interpersonal metaphor, comment adjuncts, projection and consequentiality. Traditional accounts have often understood these systems via notions of self-expression. Thus modals of probability are frequently seen as expressing doubt, uncertainty or lack of commitment to truth value on the part of the speaker/writer. I would like to explore the consequences which arise from understanding such systems via Bakhtin’s notions of dialogism and heteroglossia. That is to say, I will explore how we come to understand these systems when we see them as acting to locate speakers vis a vis the ever unfolding dialog within which all acts of communication operate, the dialog between more or less divergent experiential, attitudinal and axiological perspectives. I will pay special attention to the relationships between modals of probability and usuality, certain types of projection and certain meta-discursive items such as ‘It is my contention that’ and ‘We can only conclude’. I will propose, not entirely seriously, that we might want to add the category of ‘hearsay’ to our list of modal subtypes.

Peter WILLEMSE
University of Leuven

On expressivity

The aim of this paper is to present an introductory overview of different  interpretations of the concept of expressivity in the literature, based on the study of a (limited) number of authors. The perspective from which the different approaches to expressivity will be discussed is mainly a thematic one, i.e. less attention will be paid to chronological order and completeness than to a classification of various conceptions of expressivity with regard to ‘content’. This approach proves especially suitable for this topic, considering the wide variety of interpretations the notion expressivity has received in the literature. For the selection of the authors dealt with, two perpectives were combined. On the one hand, to borrow a term from lexical semantics, a ‘semasiological’ perspective: different conceptions of the term expressivity (and of similar terms such as expression, expressive, etc.) were taken into consideration. On the other hand, an ‘onomasiological’ perspective: an intuitive, rudimentary definition of expressivity was used to trace other terms covering the same (or at least similar) phenomena. Given the extent of the topic and the number of different existent interpretations, an exhaustive survey seems nearly unachievable and was certainly not pursued for this paper. The authors that are dealt with stem from a number of different ‘schools’ and traditions in linguistics. Most of them follow an approach that can be characterized as ‘functional’ (Martinet, Traugott, Geeraerts, Halliday & Hasan) and can be contrasted with ‘structuralists’ such as Jakobson and Bühler. A psycholinguistic approach to expressivity is represented by Slobin. A first important feature which allows a primary classification concerns the extent of the definition given to expressivity. In this connection, ‘broad(er)’ interpretations contrast with ‘narrow(er)’ ones, depending on the different features and phenomena incorporated. It will become clear that differences are often subtle and that sharp distinctions cannot always be drawn. The different theories about expressivity can further be distinguished with regard to the linguistic ‘level’ on which expressive phenomena are (especially) situated. In this connection, the structuralists’ focusing on the formal, phonetic aspects of language catches the eye. Finally, the way in which the relationship between the expressive function and another function of language, the referential function, is defined, differs: some authors maintain an absolute distinction between these two functions and their means of expression, others separate the two less clearly.

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Contents: Lieven Vandelanotte

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URL: http://wwwling.arts.kuleuven.ac.be/sfrc/fwabstracts.htm